November 1992 Mission to Abkhazia
On 15 May, 1992 Mr. V. Ardzinba, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia, sent an appeal to UNPO’s General Secretary for assistance in preventing the outbreak of violent conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia. He cited fears of the use of force by Georgia to resolve a political problem with respect to Abkhazia as the reason for urgent UNPO action, such as mediation.
In response to President Ardzinba’s request, UNPO’s General Secretary, Dr. Michael van Walt van Praag traveled to Sukhumi, capital of Abkhazia, in order to investigate the situation and assess what UNPO could contribute. The visit took place in the first week of July, 1992. Van Walt met with President Ardzinba, deputies from the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet on both sides of the dispute (the Abkhazian and the Georgian side), and local officials and residents.
In response to the Abkhazian requests, UNPO invited a number of parliamentarians or parliamentary staff members to be part of a UNPO Mission to Abkhazia, Georgia and the Chechen Republic in order to investigate the situation in Abkhazia, paying special attention to the principal elements of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the human rights situation, its relationship with developments throughout the Northern Caucasus region, and the potential for peaceful resolution of the conflict. The full report in PDF can be downloaded by clicking here (1 MB)
On 15 May, 1992 Mr. V. Ardzinba, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia, sent an appeal to UNPO’s General Secretary for assistance in preventing the outbreak of violent conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia. He cited fears of the use of force by Georgia to resolve a political problem with respect to Abkhazia as the reason for urgent UNPO action, such as mediation.
In response to President Ardzinba’s request, UNPO’s General Secretary, Dr. Michael van Walt van Praag traveled to Sukhumi, capital of Abkhazia, in order to investigate the situation and assess what UNPO could contribute. The visit took place in the first week of July, 1992. Van Walt met with President Ardzinba, deputies from the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet on both sides of the dispute (the Abkhazian and the Georgian side), and local officials and residents.
In response to the Abkhazian requests, UNPO invited a number of parliamentarians or parliamentary staff members to be part of a UNPO Mission to Abkhazia, Georgia and the Chechen Republic in order to investigate the situation in Abkhazia, paying special attention to the principal elements of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, the human rights situation, its relationship with developments throughout the Northern Caucasus region, and the potential for peaceful resolution of the conflict. The full report in PDF can be downloaded by clicking here (1 MB)
''On 21 August, Shevardnadze denied all responsibility for the military action in Abkhazia and announced the withdrawal of troops. Instead, an unsuccessful attack was staged by Georgian troops on Gudauta. Three days later, on 24 August, Shevardnadze threatened Abkhazians with full-scale war if they continued their struggle. On the same day, the new commander of Georgian troops in Sukhumi, General Georgiy Karkarashvili, warned Abkhazians in a televised address that he was prepared to sacrifice 100,000 Georgian lives to destroy 97,000 Abkhazians (the official figure for the Abkhazian population in Abkhazia) and that the Abkhazian nation would cease to exist.''
b. Human Rights and Cultural Destruction
The Mission paid special attention to allegations by both sides in the conflict of human rights violations, especially in the form of atrocities committed by the armed forces of the other side. It also paid special attention to allegations of cultural genocide. In order to assess the situation, members of the delegation spoke with refugees (Abkhazian, Georgian and others), prisoners of war in the Abkhazian camp, and residents of Sukhumi, of villages in areas under Georgian military control, and of Gagra, where some of the worst atrocities are claimed to have occurred; to local officials of these and other places; and to the representative of the ICRC (International Red Cross).
The Mission was able to obtain testimony from victims and witnesses of human rights abuses and from medical authorities. It spoke to witnesses and other credible sources about allegations of attacks on cultural institutions. And it spoke to political leaders and military authorities, including Georgian prisoners of war, about the activities and behavior of the military. The Mission's findings in this respect are necessarily preliminary, and more comprehensive investigations by human rights organizations should be undertaken as soon as possible, so as to obtain a complete picture of the situation.
The Mission obtained sufficient evidence to conclude that gross and systematic violations of human rights had occurred at the hands of Georgian troops in Abkhazia throughout the period since August 14, 1992; that these included serious violations committed against Abkhazian and other ethnic population groups in cities and villages; that civilians were the primary victims of Georgian abuses; that Georgian attacks were directed against persons identifiable as Abkhazian, and that particular attack was directed against Abkhazian political, cultural, intellectual and community leaders; that in addition to Abkhazians, also Armenians, Russians, Greeks, Ukrainians, Estonians, and other non-Georgian minorities in Abkhazia have suffered similar treatment by Georgian authorities; and that removal or destruction of the principal materials and buildings of important historical and cultural importance to Abkhazians has taken place in what appears to be an organized attempt to destroy Abkhazian culture and national identity.
With respect to allegations of gross violations committed by Abkhazian troops in Gagra, the Mission found evidence of burning of numerous houses of Georgians in a region captured by Abkhazian forces from Georgian forces. The Mission was not able to find any basis to allegations of mass killings.
The above conclusions are based on the following information gathered by the Mission:
When Georgian troops under general command of Defense Minister General Tengiz Kitovani first entered Sukhumi on August 14, Georgian soldiers attacked nonGeorgian civilians, beat them, killed many, robbed them, and looted their houses and apartments. Reports of attacks on Abkhazian, Armenian, Russian, and other non-Georgian minority civilians, including killing, torture, and burning, looting or smashing of houses or other belongings, originate from many regions of Abkhazia under Georgian military control and for the entire period since August 14.
b. Human Rights and Cultural Destruction
The Mission paid special attention to allegations by both sides in the conflict of human rights violations, especially in the form of atrocities committed by the armed forces of the other side. It also paid special attention to allegations of cultural genocide. In order to assess the situation, members of the delegation spoke with refugees (Abkhazian, Georgian and others), prisoners of war in the Abkhazian camp, and residents of Sukhumi, of villages in areas under Georgian military control, and of Gagra, where some of the worst atrocities are claimed to have occurred; to local officials of these and other places; and to the representative of the ICRC (International Red Cross).
The Mission was able to obtain testimony from victims and witnesses of human rights abuses and from medical authorities. It spoke to witnesses and other credible sources about allegations of attacks on cultural institutions. And it spoke to political leaders and military authorities, including Georgian prisoners of war, about the activities and behavior of the military. The Mission's findings in this respect are necessarily preliminary, and more comprehensive investigations by human rights organizations should be undertaken as soon as possible, so as to obtain a complete picture of the situation.
The Mission obtained sufficient evidence to conclude that gross and systematic violations of human rights had occurred at the hands of Georgian troops in Abkhazia throughout the period since August 14, 1992; that these included serious violations committed against Abkhazian and other ethnic population groups in cities and villages; that civilians were the primary victims of Georgian abuses; that Georgian attacks were directed against persons identifiable as Abkhazian, and that particular attack was directed against Abkhazian political, cultural, intellectual and community leaders; that in addition to Abkhazians, also Armenians, Russians, Greeks, Ukrainians, Estonians, and other non-Georgian minorities in Abkhazia have suffered similar treatment by Georgian authorities; and that removal or destruction of the principal materials and buildings of important historical and cultural importance to Abkhazians has taken place in what appears to be an organized attempt to destroy Abkhazian culture and national identity.
With respect to allegations of gross violations committed by Abkhazian troops in Gagra, the Mission found evidence of burning of numerous houses of Georgians in a region captured by Abkhazian forces from Georgian forces. The Mission was not able to find any basis to allegations of mass killings.
The above conclusions are based on the following information gathered by the Mission:
When Georgian troops under general command of Defense Minister General Tengiz Kitovani first entered Sukhumi on August 14, Georgian soldiers attacked nonGeorgian civilians, beat them, killed many, robbed them, and looted their houses and apartments. Reports of attacks on Abkhazian, Armenian, Russian, and other non-Georgian minority civilians, including killing, torture, and burning, looting or smashing of houses or other belongings, originate from many regions of Abkhazia under Georgian military control and for the entire period since August 14.
Medical authorities in Gudauta reported that virtually all men who had come through the Gudauta hospital, after having been held prisoner by Georgian authorities, appeared to have been severely tortured. Many had sustained multiple broken bones and burns from cigarettes or other objects on various parts of their bodies. Some had their ears partially or completely torn off.
In substantiation of what appeared to be more than isolated instances of extreme atrocities, medical authorities reported an Abkhazian woman brought in for autopsy, who had been shot both down her throat and up her vagina. They reported a man brought for autopsy (after a large sum was demanded by Georgians for his body) whose genitals had been cut off and stuffed in his mouth. The delegation took eyewitness testimony of other atrocities against Abkhazians and members of other non-Georgian ethnic groups, and further accounts of atrocities abound among these groups.
On the one hand, the activities of Georgian soldiers may be partly attributed to what Georgian authorities admitted, even maintained, was lack of control and discipline in the armed forces. A Georgian commanding officer taken prisoner by Abkhazian forces in Gagra, confirmed reports that Georgian troops had committed atrocities in Gagra. Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze himself agreed that there is no regular army in Georgia, and Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Kavsadze, Chairman of the Georgian State Committee for Human Rights and Nationality Relations, admitted that soldiers had vandalized and looted and said they were "out of control."
The "out of control" explanation is not satisfactory, however, because evidence points to authorization or encouragement by the Georgian authorities for attacks on Abkhazian and other non-Georgian civilians. Georgian soldiers who are reported to have entered Abkhaz homes and to have beaten, raped, or otherwise terrorized the inhabitants and to have looted or destroyed their belongings, are repeatedly reported to have had a list with them of names and addresses of Abkhazians to visit in this manner.
The attacks therefore did not appear to be at random. Georgian soldiers and police are reported to continue to ask persons in the streets, in particular in bread lines, to show their identity papers. When an Abkhaz is found he or she is seriously abused. The result is that the greatly diminished number of Abkhazians left in Sukhumi hardly dare to leave their rooms.
Concerning the direction given by Georgian military authorities in relation to the conduct of battle and the behavior of troops during and after battle, Georgian Minister of Defense Kitovani is reported to have told his troops that under the law of war soldiers have the right to loot for three days. The Geneva Convention forbids the use of cluster bombs, yet Abkhazian medical authorities in Gudauta report having treated a number of cluster bomb wounds in victims brought from battle areas. Cluster bombs reportedly were used extensively during late August by Georgian forces and have continued sporadically since then.
Another extensively used weapon is the "GRAD" The attacks therefore did not appear to be at random. Georgian soldiers and police are reported to continue to ask persons in the streets, in particular in bread lines, to show their identity papers. When an Abkhaz is found he or she is seriously abused. The result is that the greatly diminished number of Abkhazians left in Sukhumi, for example, hardly dare to leave their rooms.
Concerning the direction given by Georgian military authorities in relation to the conduct of battle and the behavior of troops during and after battle, Georgian Minister of Defence Kitovani is reported to have told his troops that under the law of war soldiers have the right to loot for three days. The Geneva Convention forbids the use of cluster bombs, yet Abkhazian medical authorities in Gudauta report having treated a number of cluster bomb wounds in victims brought from battle areas. Cluster bombs reportedly were used extensively during late August by Georgian forces and have continued sporadically since then.
Another extensively used weapon is the "GRAD" artillery system, which delivers a large number of shells in a chess board-like pattern, causing heavy losses to the enemy and to civilians when used on civilian targets. Additionally, the Commander-in-chief of Georgian troops in Abkhazia, General Georgiy Karkarashvili warned in a televised formal address to the Abkhaz and Georgian people in Sukhumi on August 24, that "no prisoners of war will be taken" by the Georgian troops, that "if 100,000 Georgian lose their lives, then [on the Abkhazian side] all 97,000 will be killed"; and that "the Abkhaz Nation will be left without descendants." The delegation saw a video recording of this ominous speech.
In contrast with such evidence, it appears that several weeks after Georgian troops were brought into Gagra, and while that area was still under Georgian control, Georgian troops stationed in South Ossetia were flown to Gagra. The commander of hose troops claimed they were sent by Georgian authorities in Tbilisi to restore order and to protect the civilian population in that city from ongoing rampages by Georgian troops already there.
It is also worth noting that, in contrast to the considerable number of Georgian civilians who are reported to have cooperated with Georgian military authorities in some of the acts against Abkhazian civilians and members of other minority populations, there are very frequent accounts from Abkhazians and others of local Georgians helping these Abkhazians and other persons in danger to escape, sometimes at severe risk to themselves. system, which delivers a large number of shells in a chess board-like pattern, causing heavy losses to the enemy and to civilians when used on civilian targets. Additionally, the Commander-in-chief of Georgian troops in Abkhazia, General Georgiy Karkarashvili warned in a televised formal address to the Abkhaz and Georgian people in Sukhumi on August 24, that "no prisoners of war will be taken" by the Georgian troops, that "if 100,000 Georgian lose their lives, then [on the Abkhazian side] all 97,000 will be killed"; and that "the Abkhaz Nation will be left without descendants. " The delegation saw a video recording of this ominous speech.
In contrast with such evidence, it appears that several weeks after Georgian troops were brought into Gagra, and while that area was still under Georgian control, Georgian troops stationed in South Ossetia were flown to Gagra. The commander of those troops claimed they were sent by Georgian authorities in Tbilisi to restore order and to protect the civilian population in that city from ongoing rampages by Georgian troops already there.
It is also worth noting that, in contrast to the considerable number of Georgian civilians who are reported to have cooperated with Georgian military authorities in some of the acts against Abkhazian civilians and members of other minority populations, there are very frequent accounts from Abkhazians and others of local Georgians helping these Abkhazians and other persons in danger to escape, sometimes at severe risk to themselves.
The Mission heard evidence from six Abkhazian intellectuals and professionals from Sukhumi concerning the destruction or looting of the contents, with some destruction of the buildings themselves, of the Abkhazian University, the offices of several Abkhazian cultural journals, an Abkhazian language publishing and printing house, an Abkhazian secondary school, the Abkhazian Institute of Language, Literature, and History, the Abkhazian National Museum, and the Abkhazian National Archives. Testimony concerning the burning of the National Archives building was confirmed by a Georgian witness employed in a Procuratorial office in Sukhumi at the time.
Abkhazians interviewed in Gudauta and elsewhere believe that the Georgian government is engaged in a systematic attempt to destroy the Abkhazia as a nation and the Abkhazians as a people. They point to the systematic attacks and the killings of Abkhazian civilians; and to the destruction and looting of Abkhazian homes. They also point to General Karkarashvili's television statement and to the destruction by Georgians of the principal Abkhazian institutions of cultural or historic significance in Sukhumi. They see all these as a continuation of an ongoing Georgian government policy, pointing to passages in an earlier book by now exiled Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, in which Gamsakhurdia apparently advocates the elimination of the Abkhazian intelligentsia and other extreme and oppressive policies.
With respect to human rights violations by Abkhazian and allied forces, the delegation was able to determine that some human rights violations had occurred against Georgian civilians. However, those acts did not appear to be systematic, and they never reached anything like the scale or gross nature of those committed by the Georgian military. Witnesses reported that Abkhazian authorities have been taking steps to prosecute and punish Abkhazian perpetrators of human rights violations. Georgian prisoners of war reported they were being well treated by the Abkhazian authorities. They were relaxed, shared the same rations with Abkhazian troops, and appeared to be on relatively good terms with their captors.
The Mission was particularly interested in investigating allegations of atrocities by Abkhazian troops in Gagra at the time of the recapture of that city from Georgian forces. The delegation was able to find absolutely no evidence to support two major allegations: One was the story that hundreds of Georgians had been driven into a stadium and killed; the other was that Abkhazian soldiers had gone to the hospital and killed doctors and patients there. What did seem to have taken place was the burning of many houses of Georgians who had fled the area before the Abkhazian advance. Members of the delegation saw many such houses, and were told by the Mayor of Gagra that such acts had occurred, but that he had taken measures rapidly to prevent them from continuing.
- Report of a UNPO Mission to Abkhazia, Georgia and the Northern Caucasus November, 1992
- UNPO Reports on the Abkhazia
- Related Issues
- Testimonies about Georgian-Abkhazian War - Asarkial Human Rights Group
- Abkhazia is Abkhazia - By Stanislav Lakoba, Central Asian Survey, vol. 14, no. 1
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